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OLD DILEMMAS, NEW GUISES: DEVELOPING
AN ANTI-SUBORDINATION READING OF
STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS V. HARVARD
Eric Szkarlat*
INTRODUCTION
In 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court will again hear arguments on the
constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action in college admissions.1
This outcome was far from foretold: the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
had suggested the Court might never take up affirmative action in admissions
again.2 Yet after dragging its feet on granting certiorari,3 the Court agreed to
hear Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) v. Harvard.4
This time, however, the case has a substantially different and quite
controversial posture. That posture centers on alleged discrimination against

* J.D. Candidate, 2022. Thank you to the staff of the Fordham Law Review for making this

project possible. I am forever indebted to the queer and trans Asian women who have shaped
my thinking on this issue as well as so many others. I cannot thank you enough.
1. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Presidents & Fellows of Harvard College
(SFFA III), 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022) (mem.) (granting certiorari). Notably, the question of
affirmative action was petitioned separately from the question of racial discrimination. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, SFFA III, No. 20-1199 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2021), 2021 WL
797848. This Comment assumes that the questions petitioned are actually two sides of the
same coin, designed to highlight the weakness in the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence.
Therefore, this Comment treats the questions together insofar as the Title VI question is
relevant to the affirmative action question. See infra notes 126–130 and accompanying text.
2. See David A. Strauss, Fisher v. University of Texas and the Conservative Case for
Affirmative Action, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (quoting Justice Ginsburg as saying, “I
don’t expect we’re going to see another affirmative action case, at least in education”).
3. See Amy Howe, Justices Request Government’s Views on Harvard Affirmative-Action
Dispute,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
14,
2021,
12:40
PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/justices-request-governments-views-on-harvardaffirmative-action-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/2NUL-MU5J].
4. SFFA III, 142 S. Ct. 985 (2022).
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Asian and Pacific American (APA)5 students applying to college.6 Some
APA students are divided on affirmative action.7 Going all the way back to
the Court’s door-opening decision in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,8 the relationship between APA students and affirmative action has
been questioned.9 The proponents of affirmative action plans often have not
produced compelling answers.10 Some scholars suggest that the issue may
be intractable under current doctrine, as APA applicants do not neatly fit into
either the “diversity” interest adopted in Grutter v. Bollinger,11 nor the
“remedy for societal discrimination” interest generally rejected by the
Court.12 Growing hostility and violence against APAs in the United States
5. The case discussed in this Comment deals with Harvard University, which groups
APAs (other than Native Hawaiians) into the same category in its admissions process. See
Admissions Statistics: A Brief Profile of the Admitted Class of 2025, HARVARD COLL.,
https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics [https://perma.cc/9DV8-DUCZ]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2022). Therefore, this Comment will generally use “APA” to refer to
Asian and Pacific Americans. Note, however, that the grouping together of Asian and Pacific
Americans has many shortcomings, as the history of European and American colonization in
the Pacific Islands differs dramatically from the geopolitical history of many parts of mainland
Asia. See, e.g., Lisa Kahaleole Hall, Navigating Our Own “Sea of Islands”: Remapping a
Theoretical Space for Hawaiian Women and Indigenous Feminism, 24 WICAZO SA REV. 15
(2009); see also infra Part I.A. If a term for a particular nationality is relevant and available,
this Comment will use that. Where the term “Asian” suitably highlights the racism
experienced by APAs (e.g., “anti-Asian hate”), this Comment will use that. As a formal
matter, “Asian” is the Census-designated term for anyone descended from “the original
peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent.” About the Topic of Race,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/topics/population/race/about.html
[https://perma.cc/X68G-8XXN] (last visited Mar. 12, 2022). However, the term “Asian,”
while useful to some extent, masks a great deal of diversity among APAs. See, e.g., Nicole
Robertshaw & Jimmy Koo, AAPI Communities Are Not a Monolith, APCO WORLDWIDE (May
18,
2021),
https://apcoworldwide.com/blog/aapi-communities-are-not-a-monolith/
[https://perma.cc/R2AZ-6DUB].
6. Brief for Petitioner at 26–46, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President &
Fellows of Harvard College, (SFFA II) 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020) (No. 19-2005).
7. See, e.g., Janelle Marie Salanga, Challenging the Model Minority Myth: AsianAmerican Students Divided over Affirmative Action, CALMATTERS (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://calmatters.org/education/higher-education/college-beat-highereducation/2020/10/asian-american-students-affirmative-action/
[https://perma.cc/YZ3LPNTN].
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9. During oral argument, Chief Justice Warren Burger used a term historically used in
the law to refer to APA peoples. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811). This term has a derogatory history, and
several efforts have been made by legislators to eliminate its use. See Yanan Wang, The Long
History and Slow Death of a Word Once Used to Describe Everyone and Everything from
Egypt to China as Well as Rugs, WASH. POST (May 13, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/05/13/the-long-history-andslow-death-of-a-word-used-to-describe-everyone-from-turks-to-the-chinese/
[https://perma.cc/EJV6-DRXS].
10. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
11. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
12. See Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action,
15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 263–65 (1995) (noting that it would be legitimate to exclude
Asian Americans from college affirmative action programs under “all of the leading
theories”); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (rejecting the “societal discrimination” interest);
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323–25 (discussing and adopting Justice Powell’s analysis in Bakke).
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during the COVID-19 pandemic13 only bolsters the gravity of the case, as
this hostility exhibits the deeply rooted and lingering discrimination from
which APA communities still suffer.14
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I sets forth relevant history as
to the U.S. government’s targeting of APAs and the relevant law governing
policies that consider race in university admissions. Part II examines a
central tension in equal protection jurisprudence between the “antisubordination” principle and the “anti-classification” principle. Part III
argues that grounding the university’s compelling interest in diversity in antisubordination values would revitalize race-based affirmative action in higher
education admissions while also advancing the interests of APA students.
I. ASIAN AND PACIFIC AMERICANS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
For years, it has been repeated that APAs are not a monolith.15 But the
law often paints race in broad strokes: the U.S. Census’s racial categories,
for example, only distinguish “Asian”16 from “Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander.”17 Harvard appears to lump both these groups together in
an online demographic profile of its students.18 While perhaps useful to some
limited extent, this choice masks a great deal of diversity among APA
students.19 For one thing, there is diversity of ethnic background: APAs
could have ancestry in China, the Philippines, Tonga, Japan, or many other
countries.20 Additionally, APAs can be from families that have lived in the
United States for generations, or they might have recently immigrated—
whether freely or as refugees or adopted children of non-APA parents.21
Further, income inequality among APA peoples in the United States is higher
than for any other racial group in the country.22

13. See Sakshi Venkatraman, Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Rose 73% Last Year, Updated FBI
Data Says, NBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2021, 4:33 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asianamerica/anti-asian-hate-crimes-rose-73-last-year-updated-fbi-data-says-rcna3741
[https://perma.cc/9VQR-4P3U].
14. See generally Denny Chin & Kathy Hirata Chin, “Kung Flu”: A History of Hostility
and Violence Against Asian Americans, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 1889 (2022).
15. See Li Zhou, The Inadequacy of the Term “Asian American”, VOX (May 5, 2021,
10:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/22380197/asian-american-pacific-islanderAAPI-heritage-anti-asian-hate-attacks [https://perma.cc/XQ4J-F8RV].
16. See About the Topic of Race, supra note 5.
17. Id.
18. See Admissions Statistics, supra note 5.
19. See Robertshaw & Koo, supra note 5.
20. Under the Census designations, “Asian” peoples originated in countries including,
“for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine
Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam,” while “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander” peoples
originated in places including “Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, [and] other Pacific Islands.” About the
Topic of Race, supra note 5.
21. Brief for Asian Am. Legal Defense & Educ. Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendant-Appellant at 3–4, SFFA II, 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020) (No. 19-2005) [hereinafter
Amicus Brief for AALDEF].
22. See Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, Income Inequality in the U.S. is Rising Most
Rapidly Among Asians, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 12, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-
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As Part I explains, however, U.S. law has scarcely dignified—or
vindicated the rights of—APA peoples. Part I.A examines the role that APA
peoples have played in the development of U.S. law, with a specific focus on
education. Part I.B examines the relevant cases that develop the Court’s
affirmative action jurisprudence.
A. The Road to SFFA v. Harvard
The U.S. government’s treatment of APAs also casts a long shadow, the
effects of which are still felt in the law today.23 Within the framework of
U.S. policy attempting to subjugate APA peoples, education has provided its
own flashpoints,24 discussed here in two parts. Part I.A.1 discusses early
legal discrimination against, and segregation of, APA peoples, focusing
primarily on state and federal educational policies targeting Chinese,
Japanese, and Filipino peoples. Part I.A.2 examines related developments
after 1965.
1. Educational Subordination
In the mid-nineteenth century, California passed a law prohibiting
“Mongolian[]” children, among others, from attending public school.25 In
1880, these race-based restrictions were repealed,26 but discrimination
persisted. In Tape v. Hurley,27 the California Supreme Court struck down a
school board’s action not to admit Chinese students because it would deprive
Chinese children of their right to educational opportunity.28 As a result, the
state had to allow Chinese students to attend public schools.29
The win did not last long. The California legislature moved quickly to
resegregate Chinese students out of schools.30 After Plessy v. Ferguson31—
the famous dissent to which unfavorably compared Chinese immigrants to
Black people32—the constitutionality of these segregated schools for APA
trends/2018/07/12/income-inequality-in-the-u-s-is-rising-most-rapidly-among-asians/
[https://perma.cc/6RQR-YU3P].
23. See generally Denny Chin & Kathy Hirata Chin, Asian Americans and the Law, 11
JUD. NOTICE 6 (2016).
24. Historical perspectives on Asian Americans in education are sometimes scant. See
generally Eileen H. Tamura, Asian Americans in the History of Education: An
Historiographical Essay, 41 HIST. EDUC. Q. 58, 65–68 (2001) (performing a review of the
“few” existing historical books and essays on the subject).
25. Act of Mar. 22, 1864, ch. 209, 1864 Cal. Stat. 209, § 68.
26. Act of Apr. 7, 1880, ch. 54, 1880 Cal. Stat. 38, § 26.
27. 6 P. 129 (Cal. 1885).
28. Id. at 129–30.
29. Id.
30. Act of Mar. 12, 1885, ch. 117, 1885 Cal. Stat. 99–100, § 1. Notably, the Court did not
confirm the citizenship of Chinese people born within the United States until 1898. See
generally United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).
31. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
32. See id. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a thorough discussion of Justice Harlan’s
anti-Asian racism, see Gabriel J. Chin, The First Justice Harlan by the Numbers: Just How
Great Was “The Great Dissenter?”, 32 AKRON L. REV. 629 (1999). Despite Justice Harlan’s
virulent anti-Asian sentiments, SFFA and its amici rely heavily on Justice Harlan’s statement
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students was confirmed in Gong Lum v. Rice.33 While the Tape and Gong
Lum cases each involved Chinese students, the decision in Gong Lum applied
broadly to the “yellow races”—that is, all APA students.34
Other educational policies of the United States targeted other APA
communities. For example, during the United States’s occupation of the
Philippines, President William McKinley proclaimed a policy of “benevolent
assimilation” for Filipinos.35
During this time, the United States
administered the country’s public schools,36 using English as the mode of
teaching, which was seen as superior to the local languages.37 One scholar
attributed the absence of a national literature to the widespread use of English
in the Philippines.38 Additionally, during World War II, Japanese children
imprisoned in internment camps suffered poor schooling conditions.39
2. The Post-War Period
After World War II, a number of changes occurred in the law, and public
perception shifted along with it.40 In 1954, famously, Brown v. Board of
Education41 ended de jure segregated schooling.42 Then, in 1965,
comprehensive immigration and civil rights reform allowed many more
immigrants, including those from Asia, into the country.43
Questions began swirling about APA students and affirmative action
policies as early as the Bakke case in 1978. In oral arguments, Chief Justice
Burger asked about how affirmative action policies affected APA students.44
Professor Archibald Cox, attorney for the University of California, merely
that the “constitution is colorblind” in their briefs. See Brief for Petitioner at 47, SFFA III, No.
20-1199 (U.S. May 2, 2022); Brief for Texas as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, SFFA
III, No. 20-1199 (U.S. May 9, 2022) (quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, 163 U.S. at
559).
33. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
34. Id. at 87. Justice William H. Taft’s language evokes the notion of “yellow peril,”
which refers to a racist fear in the United States that Asian people pose a threat to Western
civilization. For a full discussion on the origins of “yellow peril,” see Stanford M. Lyman,
The “Yellow Peril” Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Discourse, 13 INT’L J.
POL., CULTURE, & SOC’Y 683 (2000).
35. See Kenton J. Clymer, Not So Benevolent Assimilation: The Philippine-American
War, 11 REVS. AM. HIST. 547, 547 (1983).
36. See id. at 549; see also Napoleon J. Casambre, The Impact of American Education in
the Philippines, 21 EDUC. PERSPS. 7, 7 (1982).
37. See Casambre, supra note 36, at 9, 12.
38. Id. at 13.
39. See Hui Wu, Writing and Teaching Behind Barbed Wire: An Exiled Composition
Class in a Japanese-American Internment Camp, 59 COLL. COMPOSITION & COMMC’N 237,
241 (2007).
40. See Chin & Chin, supra note 14, at 1920.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. Id. at 495.
43. See Wu, supra note 12, at 244–45. These new waves of immigrants have tended to
be well-educated, reflecting the nature of U.S. immigration policy and the significance of
socioeconomic background. Id. (noting that in 1980 nearly 36 percent of foreign-born Asians
in the United States had completed four years or more of college, compared with about 16
percent of native-born Asian citizen of the United States).
44. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 20.
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alluded to a few recent cases involving discriminatory property laws.45 Since
that time, how affirmative action relates to APA students has been an open
question.46 According to some APA students, they pay the “Asian Penalty,”
defined as a limit on the number of APA students who can be admitted.47
Further, public perception of APA peoples and students has changed
significantly in the post-war period amid the proliferation of the “model
minority” myth.48 This myth refers to the harmful stereotype that APA
peoples achieve success in the “right” ways and chiefly provides a tactic to
put down other people of color.49 The myth accords with widespread
prejudice that APA students always or naturally perform better in school and
attributes much of this performance to cultural values of APA peoples.50
The reality is much more complicated. While average school performance
and income levels for APA peoples are generally higher than other races,
disaggregated data show wide inequality among different APA
communities.51 Furthermore, while APA students are less segregated
overall, they are still highly concentrated in schooling environments where
minority races make up the majority of the students.52 It is wrong to assume,
then, that all APA students experience less segregated schooling
environments, greater prosperity, and better academic performance than their
Black and Latinx counterparts.53 It is also quite wrong to assume that APA
students always fare better than white students.54

45. Since Professor Cox’s argument rested in part on remedying discrimination
throughout society, he noted how Asian peoples faced discrimination in non-educational
contexts. Id. at 20–21; see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (overturning
discriminatory state property laws); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 422
(1948) (overturning discriminatory state property laws).
46. See Abigail Nurse, Anti-Subordination in the Equal Protection Clause: A Case Study,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 320–21 (2014) (examining Justice Alito’s questioning during oral
arguments in Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (Fisher I)).
47. See Alvin Chang, Asians Are Being Used to Make the Case Against Affirmative
Action.
Again.,
VOX
(Aug.
30,
2018,
1:19
PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/3/28/17031460/affirmative-action-asian-discriminationadmissions [https://perma.cc/KS4Q-YMV7]; Sharad Goel & Julian Nyarko, Justices Will
Hear a Challenge to Affirmative Action That Isn’t Really About Affirmative Action, WASH.
POST
(Feb.
22,
2022,
7:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/22/supreme-court-harvard-affirmativeaction/ [https://perma.cc/4C87-L3LG].
48. Wu, supra note 12, at 226.
49. See id. at 229 (“The model minority myth of Asian Americans has been used since the
Sixties to denigrate other nonwhites.”).
50. See id. at 226.
51. Kimberly Goyette & Yu Xie, Educational Expectations of Asian American Youths:
Determinants and Ethnic Differences, SOCIO. EDUC., Jan. 1999, at 22, 23.
52. See GARY ORFIELD, ASIAN STUDENTS AND MULTIETHNIC DESEGREGATION 2–3 (1994),
https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/asian-students-and-multiethnic-desegregation/asian-students_orfield_glass.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EPH6-RX6J].
53. See id.
54. Cf. Goyette & Xie, supra note 51, at 23.
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B. The Law of Affirmative Action in College Admissions
The Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees that states shall not deny
any person “equal protection of the laws,”55 governs affirmative action cases.
The Court has generally rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment can
be applied to remedy societal discrimination against groups.56 They have,
however, upheld affirmative action programs under the strict scrutiny
standard of review because the state has a compelling interest in achieving a
“diverse student body.”57 As the Court reasoned, “the ‘nation’s future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores
of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”58 Thus, the exposure
of its students to new ideas, which in turn train better citizens and
professionals, supports the compelling interest of the state implementing
affirmative action.59
In Bakke, this rationale did not satisfy Justice Thurgood Marshall. Justice
Marshall noted that the Constitution, as historically interpreted, had
permitted pervasive discrimination.60 He discussed, at length, the history of
Jim Crow before turning to the Court’s jurisprudence, which seemed to
support the idea that remedying societal discrimination was a compelling
interest.61 Justice Marshall’s stand-alone opinion did not exactly catch fire,
though its reasoning appeared salient to Justice Sotomayor in Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.62 In contrast to Justice Marshall,
Justice Sotomayor tailored her dissent to educational discrimination, rather
than discussing general societal discrimination.63
In 2003, the Supreme Court again held that race-based affirmative action
was inherently suspect and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny. In Gratz v.
Bollinger,64 the Court held the University of Michigan’s race-based
affirmative action program unconstitutional because it provided for little to
no assessment of individual applicants.65 However, the Court upheld the
University of Michigan’s “critical mass” policy in Grutter v. Bollinger,66
premised in part on a value-added theory of affirmative action,67 without

55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, cl. 2.
56. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307–11 (1978); Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323–25 (2003) (endorsing Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke and
discussing his rejection of the “societal discrimination” rationale).
57. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12.
58. Id. at 313 (citation omitted).
59. See id. In Bakke, the University’s medical school admissions policy was under review.
See id. at 269.
60. See id. at 387–402 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 393–96.
62. 572 U.S. 291, 337 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 381–92.
64. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
65. See id. at 271.
66. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
67. Id. at 330. What I call the “value-added” theory of affirmative action has been called
a “market-driven” theory. See Ofra Bloch, Diversity Gone Wrong: A Historical Inquiry into
the Evolving Meaning of Diversity from Bakke to Fisher, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1145, 1178
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ruling it an impermissible quota.68 The Court emphasized the delivery of an
improved educational product to students.69 Somewhat confusingly,
however, Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court stated that consideration
of race should be limited to twenty-five years.70 The Court’s later affirmative
action decisions ignored the statement.71 The Court upheld affirmative
action again in the narrow decision Fisher v. University of Texas,72 which
affirmed student body diversity as a compelling interest.73 Today, the
Department of Education maintains a series of policy guidance encouraging
the use of race to achieve diversity in higher education.74
II. ANTI-SUBORDINATION AND ANTI-CLASSIFICATION
In discussions about affirmative action, unsettled questions about the
Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning often resurface. Professor Owen Fiss
ignited one such major debate in 1976.75 He argued in favor of what became
known as the anti-subordination principle76 underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment, as contrasted with its anti-classification principle.77 Part II.A
discusses the anti-subordination principle. Part II.B discusses the anticlassification principle.
A. Anti-Subordination
Professor Fiss’s anti-subordination principle would guide courts to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment so that the laws of the states cannot
subordinate any particular group of people.78 Professor Fiss acknowledged
that this principle is difficult to locate in the text or original meaning of the
Amendment,79 but he argued that the spirit of the Amendment seeks to
eliminate racial subordination.80 Accordingly, equal protection enforcement
would center not around preventing mere “arbitrary” discrimination but

(2018). This theory emphasizes the utilitarian, commercially-centered reasoning underlying
the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence. See id.
68. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
69. See id. at 328; Bloch, supra note 67, at 1190.
70. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
71. See generally Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198
(2016) (Fisher II).
72. 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
73. Id. at 308–09.
74. See Supporting Racial Diversity, OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/pro-students/issues/roi-issue07.html
[https://perma.cc/KY3P-3ZBQ] (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).
75. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFS. 107 (1976).
76. Professor Fiss called this concept the “group-disadvantaging principle.” See id. at
147–49.
77. Professor Fiss called this the “antidiscrimination principle.” See id. at 108–09.
78. See id. at 157.
79. See id. at 172–73.
80. See id. at 147 (“[T]he original intent [was that] the Clause was viewed as a means of
safeguarding blacks from hostile state action.”).
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would focus on preventing “invidious” discrimination, which aggravates the
subordinate position of disadvantaged groups.81
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Bakke represents perhaps the firmest
expression of the anti-subordination principle in affirmative action
jurisprudence.82 His tracing of the long legacy of slavery and the history of
discrimination against Black people in higher education clarified how Black
people had been legally subjugated throughout history.83 But he was not the
only one discussing affirmative action in these terms: President Lyndon B.
Johnson’s initial outline of affirmative action during a speech at Howard
University sounded in anti-subordination,84 as did Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent in Schuette.85
As a strictly legal matter, however, anti-subordination remains a subject of
academic intrigue, rather than law.86 In the affirmative action context, this
is because the Court in Grutter adopted Justice Powell’s Bakke analysis—
finding only a university’s interest in diversity to be a compelling interest.87
But there are necessary limits to anti-subordination, as Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence protects the rights of individuals, not of groups.88
Anti-subordination advocates have not always clearly situated APA
peoples into the anti-subordination story.89 Professor Cox’s lackluster
answer during Bakke oral arguments suggested a lack of thought toward the
treatment of APA peoples in the educational context.90 And, certainly, when
the group boundaries are drawn as broadly as Harvard has drawn them,
problems arise with seeing certain groups as disadvantaged according to
contemporary metrics.91 If, for example, universities see only the aggregated
data showing that the average APA household makes more money than the
81. Id. at 109 n.1.
82. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387–402 (1978)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. See id.
84. See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University:
To
Fulfill
These
Rights
(June
4,
1965),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/commencement-address-howard-universityfulfill-these-rights [https://perma.cc/AT7N-V36H].
85. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 337–92 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
86. See Nurse, supra note 46, at 295 (calling anti-subordination an “academic principle”).
87. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
88. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). Several briefs supporting SFFA
expressly address anti-subordination arguments. See Brief for U.S. Senators and
Representatives as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, SFFA III, No. 20-1199 (U.S. May
9, 2022); Brief for The Foundation Against Intolerance & Racism as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 4–20, SFFA III, No. 20-1199 (U.S. May 9, 2022). SFFA’s brief on
the merits specifically states that the problem with segregation, for example, was the
classification itself. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 32 at 6; see also infra Part II.B.
89. See Wu, supra note 12, at 263. For one attempt to apply anti-subordination principles
to one APA community, see Victor C. Romero, Are Filipinas Asians or Latinas?: Reclaiming
the Anti-Subordination Objective of Equal Protection After Grutter and Gratz, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 765 (2005).
90. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

158

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 90

average white household, then they would be hard-pressed to say that APA
peoples are subordinated.92 And since racial categories on admissions
applications largely come from Census designations, it is not clear that
universities can meaningfully adjust these categories to control for issues of
line-drawing.93 As a result, anti-subordination arguments relating to APA
peoples in higher education are uncommon.94
B. Anti-Classification
The more dominant interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment follows
what Professor Fiss calls the “antidiscrimination” principle,95 also known as
the “anti-classification” principle.96 Under this interpretation, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects individuals, not groups, and typically, advocates of
anti-classification argue for prohibition of any official consideration of race,
regardless of past discrimination.97
The anti-classification principle clearly appeared to influence the Court in
Bakke and Grutter. The Bakke Court notably stressed the importance of
individual consideration of each applicant.98 The Court’s rationale in
Grutter, on the other hand, focused on the educational value of diversity.99
In other words, the Court appraised the educational product that the school
would deliver to its students if it had a diverse student body.100 The Court
further stressed that applicants should still be reviewed as individuals.101
Together, these cases have caused higher education policymakers to focus
on what is called the “proportionate ideal”—that is, an aspiration to assemble
a student body population that reflects virtually the same racial demographics
as general society.102 As a result, colleges sometimes defend themselves
against charges of bias against APA students on the grounds that such
students are overrepresented on campus relative to their share of the general
population.103 But many APA students believe that the current state of racebased affirmative action causes universities to lower the number of accepted
92. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
93. This Comment limits itself to analyzing the law of affirmative action, not to
recommending any particular university policy. However, this Comment does argue that
poorly drawn constitutional parameters may lead to poorly drawn policies. See infra notes
126–130 and accompanying text.
94. For one such case, however, see Romero, supra note 89.
95. See Fiss, supra note 75, at 108–29 (outlining the anti-discrimination principle and its
appeal).
96. Nurse, supra note 46, at 298–300.
97. Fiss, supra note 75, at 129–30.
98. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978).
99. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–33 (2003).
100. See id.
101. Id. at 337.
102. See Chan Hee Chu, When Proportionality Equals Diversity: Asian Americans and
Affirmative Action, 23 ASIAN AM. L.J. 99, 104–10 (2016).
103. P.R. Lockhart, The Lawsuit Against Harvard that Could Change Affirmative Action
in College Admissions, Explained, VOX (Oct. 18, 2018, 8:00 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/10/18/17984108/harvard-asian-americans-affirmative-actionracial-discrimination [https://perma.cc/87ZV-PDVU].
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APA applicants artificially because, despite their qualifications, their
acceptance would not serve greater diversity.104 The framework under which
colleges are alleged to discriminate against APA applicants to maintain a
“proportionate ideal” is often described as “negative action.”105
Justice O’Connor’s twenty-five-year limit in Grutter provokes further
questions about the diversity interest.106 If the compelling interest in
diversity rests primarily on how it enhances the education delivered by the
school, why would it be time-limited? Should the educational value of
racially diverse perspectives not endure? In other words, what about
affirmative consideration of racial diversity in higher education now would
promote greater racial diversity in higher education later?107
III. APPLYING ANTI-SUBORDINATION
This Comment suggests an answer to those questions: the antisubordination principle implicitly persuaded the Court to uphold the
University of Michigan’s affirmative action policies. It is the implicit antisubordination, rather than the explicit reasoning of Justice Marshall, which
advocates may use when arguing SFFA v. Harvard in October 2022.
An explicitly anti-subordination jurisprudence of the Fourteenth
Amendment currently seems unreachable.108 But Professor Fiss notes that
the anti-subordination principle persuades judges, even when they do not
expressly endorse it.109 Indeed, anti-subordination seemed to animate Justice
O’Connor’s time limitation and discussion of the role education plays in
cultivating good citizens, while the opinion itself generally sounds more like
an anti-classification ruling.110 If diversity now will serve to end affirmative
consideration of race later, then diversity now should be concerned, at least
in part, with reversing the legacies of the laws by which certain races were
subordinated.111 And if that is the case, then diversity efforts now ought to
include a consideration of the historical subordination of APA students.112
The laws of this country have unquestionably sought to subordinate APA
peoples.113 And while there is a great deal of diversity among APA
peoples,114 and significant differences in the way the law has treated each

104. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Julie J. Park, Interest Convergence, Negative Action, and SFFA vs. Harvard,
26 ASIAN AM. L.J. 13, 16–18 (2019).
106. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
107. This Comment argues that Grutter embraced anti-subordination values, but it is not
the first to do so. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 67, at 1173, 1179–80 (arguing that antisubordination values were present in Grutter).
108. See supra notes 56–72 and accompanying text.
109. See Fiss, supra note 75, at 175.
110. See supra notes 59, 69 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 25–39 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 25–39 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text.
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individual APA community,115 it is still clear that race-based affirmative
action does—or, at minimum, should—help APAs.116
The petitioners in SFFA, therefore, suffer from a flaw of reasoning
endemic to the model minority myth: they advance one narrative—that of
the highly successful APA student who fails to be admitted to Harvard—and
characterize it as universal to all APA students.117 They strain to assert that
this one experience demonstrates that Grutter must be overruled.118 By so
doing, the petitioners disregard the differences and diversity within APA
communities.119 Applying anti-subordination values, by contrast, would
force advocates to consider inequalities among APA communities and
understand where the law—especially education law120—has contributed to
these inequalities.121 Supreme Court Justices also express interest in racial
inequities in standardized testing, so advocates may consider making welltailored arguments on historical and present educational inequities in
testing.122
But perhaps SFFA is not the only party to elide the complexity of APA
communities. At least one amicus brief for the case notes that Harvard
originally adopted a race-conscious admissions policy to limit the number of
Jewish students on campus and compares limitations against Jewish students
to those alleged against APA students.123 That Harvard places all APA
students in the broad category of “Asians,” without separately noting its
proportion of Pacific American students despite the Census doing so,124
suggests that Harvard may not be fully recognizing the complexity of APA
communities either.
115. See supra notes 25–39 and accompanying text.
116. Amicus Brief for AALDEF, supra note 21, at 1–8. Certainly, if racial diversity is the
goal, then some “overrepresentation” of APA applicants would primarily enhance racial
diversity, largely because of the lack of parity among APA peoples. See supra notes 15–22
and accompanying text. Of course, as an initial matter, the admitted students would have to
be drawn from a sample representative of APA communities in the United States. But that
fact alone is hardly a reason to find affirmative action unlawful.
117. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
118. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5–9, SFFA III, No. 20-1199 (U.S. May 24, 2021), 2021
WL 2182173.
119. See supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text.
120. Justice Powell’s concern about the societal discrimination interest stemmed in part
from its lack of “focus[]” and its “amorphous” nature. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
121. See supra notes 25–39, 51–54 and accompanying text.
122. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2234 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 369–70 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Certainly, this Comment has focused
on some educational inequities as matters of history. See supra Part I.A. However, Justice
Sotomayor’s public comments have also focused on these very present testing inequities.
Charlie Savage, Videos Shed New Light on Sotomayor’s Positions, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/politics/11judge.html
[https://perma.cc/6HF7-2X9U] (quoting Sotomayor to say in the 1990s that “cultural biases”
are built into standardized tests, which is one motivation for affirmative action policies).
123. Brief for Louis D. Brandeis Ctr. for Hum. Rts. Under L. and the Silicon Valley
Chinese Ass’n Found. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5–19, SFFA III, No. 20-1199
(U.S. Mar. 31, 2021), 2021 WL 1255541.
124. See supra notes 5, 16, 20 and accompanying text.
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But the Harvard policy is wrong because the constitutional parameter
around affirmative action has been poorly drawn.125 By emphasizing the
diversity interest, the Court encouraged a “proportionate ideal,”126 which
does not always serve APA students.127 Indeed, the proportionate ideal
sounds a bit like an impermissible quota.128 Accordingly, there can be no
defense that “overrepresentation” should cause a university to suppress
affirmative consideration of any given student’s race.129 Rather, racial
diversity should be used as a plus-factor on APA students’ applications, and
negative action should not be permitted.130
Of course, the trial court found that Harvard’s policy was appropriate and
did not discriminate against APA students.131 But SFFA is about more than
the specifics of Harvard’s admissions policy. It is also the latest attempt to
overrule Grutter and compel the Court to find that race-based affirmative
action in college admissions is unconstitutional.132 However, because of the
country’s history of legal subordination of APA peoples, the Court should
not do so.133
It may be true that the subordination of APA peoples has not been
coextensive with that of Black and Indigenous peoples.134 But this
distinction cannot justify eliminating race-conscious admissions programs.
Federal and state law have historically denied Asian and Pacific immigrants
and citizens equal protection in education.135 APA students have suffered
segregation.136 Japanese people suffered poor educational conditions while
interned.137 Filipino people experienced colonialist assimilation policies
under U.S.-administered education.138 Some universities even expressly
precluded consideration of Japanese people during World War II.139
The recent anti-Asian attacks should weigh heavily upon us all.140 The
COVID-19 pandemic, along with politicians and the media blaming China
and Chinese people for the virus, have exposed and aggravated anti-Asian
hate.141 If there ever were a time for the Supreme Court to recognize the
125. Indeed, the racial categories of “Asian” and “Pacific Islander” may by themselves be
too broadly drawn, but this inquiry falls outside the scope of this Comment. See supra notes
5, 15–17 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 103, 105 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
131. See SFFA v. Harvard (SFFA I), 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 198–99 (D. Mass. 2019).
132. See Chang, supra note 47.
133. See supra notes 25–39, 75–94 and accompanying text.
134. See Wu, supra note 12, at 263.
135. See supra notes 25–39 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
139. See generally Eric Langowski, Education Denied: Indiana University’s Japanese
American Ban, 1942 to 1945, 115 IND. MAG. HIST. 65, 65 (2019).
140. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
141. See Dylan Wells, “Not Just About COVID”: Lawmakers Warn China Bashing in
Congress Could Spur New Wave of Anti-Asian Hate, USA TODAY (Feb. 21, 2022, 12:17 PM),
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legacy of racist laws aiming to subordinate APA peoples in this country, it
would be now.
Unfortunately, such recognition could also present a double-edged sword
to affirmative action advocates. Certainly, the Court could acknowledge all
of this history, and then say that the present condition of Harvard’s
affirmative action plan only carries that legacy forward.142 Such reasoning
would require the Supreme Court to acknowledge that anti-subordination
arguments can, even ad arguendo, influence their Fourteenth Amendment
decision-making, but it would ultimately uphold the anti-classification
principle. Because this reasoning would not hold across other racial
demographics, any decision rendered on this basis would necessarily be at
least as doctrinally confused as Grutter.143 Taken together, filings made by
or in support of SFFA touch both on anti-classification principles and on antisubordination principles.144
Certainly, however, the Grutter decision needs greater clarity, and for this
reason, advocates for Harvard should urge the Court to clarify the doctrine
by addressing this sordid history of subordination. The amicus briefs,
however, tell a different story: in the litigation below, the only briefs raising
detailed histories of subordination were filed in support of SFFA.145 In
supporting SFFA’s petition for certiorari, some other amicus briefs likened
APA students at Harvard to Jewish students in the early twentieth century.146
Most recently, several of the amicus briefs supporting petitioner on the merits
raise arguments about anti-Asian subordination.147 By contrast, briefs
opposing SFFA’s petition to the Supreme Court did not touch upon the
history of anti-Asian racism.148
When Respondents and their amici file their briefs on the merits, they
should sketch this sordid history for the Court. The Court probably will not
announce that the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted according to
an anti-subordination principle any time in the near future, and it is not clear
that Professor Fiss ever thought the Court would.149 The anti-subordination
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/02/19/anti-china-rhetoric-aapihate/9289187002/?gnt-cfr=1 [https://perma.cc/3DHM-YCXN].
142. See Brief for Pac. Legal Found., et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. and Reversal at 15–17, SFFA II, 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir.
2020) (No. 19-2005) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for PLF].
143. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
144. Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 30–31, SFFA III, No. 20-1199 (U.S. Feb.
25, 2021), 2021 WL 797848, with Amicus Brief for PLF, supra note 142, at 17–18.
145. See, e.g., Amicus Brief for PLF, supra note 142, at 17–18.
146. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
147. See Brief for U.S. Senators and Representatives, supra note 88, at 23–25; Brief for the
Asian Am. Coalition for Educ. & The Asian Am. Legal Foundation at 19–26, SFFA III, No.
20-1199 (U.S. May 9, 2022).
148. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition at 35–36, SFFA III, No. 20-1199, 2021 WL 2004129
(noting adverse effects of overturning Grutter but not those on APA students). But see Amicus
Brief for AALDEF, supra note 21, at 3–6 (discussing adverse impacts of overruling Grutter
on APA students but failing to discuss any history of subordination targeting APA
communities).
149. See Fiss, supra note 75, at 175.
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principle simply insists that the justices not forget what they know to be true
as citizens.150 The metric should not be whether the subordination was coextensive with that of other racial groups, but whether it was enshrined in
federal and state law.151 It was.152 There can be no doubt that federal and
state law have subordinated APA peoples.153 The anti-subordination
principle merely admonishes us to remember.
When litigating SFFA this year, therefore, respondents should stress this
history. In Fisher I, the justices seemed to expect anti-subordination
arguments, but the advocates did not make them.154 Affirmative action then
was narrowly spared.155 The argument now should be even stronger: there
is a compelling interest in diversity, in part because affirmative consideration
of race will still serve to level the playing field for APA applicants in the
future.156 Thus, universities can do their part to correct the unequal
protection extended to APA peoples by the laws of the country. Equal
protection requires a balanced equation, and narrowing the focus to an
individual neglects the histories and legacies of racism that have bound so
many communities of color to disparate outcomes.157 Such neglect allows
history to repeat itself through facially neutral criteria.158 The better
argument says that, where history shows unequal protection, Congress
should enforce the law to restore the balance.159 Preventing the “old
dilemma” of educational subordination from occurring again in a “new
guise” requires it.160
CONCLUSION
APA communities have suffered a great deal of legal discrimination
throughout history and the present. The anti-subordination principle teaches
that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the power to remedy
this history. Since anti-subordination is primarily a persuasive argument for
upholding anti-subordination policies, respondents in SFFA should note the
history of subordination in education inflicted upon APA communities,
incorporating it within the recognized diversity interest. Doing so may help
persuade the Court to preserve affirmative action.

150. See United States v. Zubaydah, No. 20-827, slip op. at 1 (Mar. 3, 2022) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
151. Cf. Wu, supra note 12, at 263–71; see also Gabriel J. Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest:
Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Community of Justice, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129,
143–60 (1996).
152. See supra notes 25–39 and accompanying text.
153. See generally Chin & Chin, supra note 23.
154. Nurse, supra note 46, at 320–21.
155. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., supra notes 15–39 and accompanying text.
158. See Fiss, supra note 75, at 141–46.
159. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; id. § 5.
160. See Fiss, supra note 75, at 177.

